|
|
| Line 111: |
Line 111: |
| | | | |
| | ==Bibliography== | | ==Bibliography== |
| − |
| |
| − | ==Synopsis==
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Basic approach===
| |
| − | Kuhn's approach to the [[history of science|history]] and [[philosophy of science]] focuses on conceptual issues like the practice of [[normal science]], influence of historical events, emergence of scientific discoveries, nature of scientific revolutions and progress through [[scientific revolution]]s.<ref>Kuhn, Thomas (1962), ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions''. p.3.</ref> What sorts of intellectual options and strategies were available to people during a given period? What types of lexicons and terminology were known and employed during certain epochs? Stressing the importance of not attributing traditional thought to earlier investigators, Kuhn's book argues that the evolution of scientific theory does not emerge from the straightforward accumulation of facts, but rather from a set of changing intellectual circumstances and possibilities.<ref>Kuhn, Thomas (1962), ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|9780226458113}}.</ref> Such an approach is largely commensurate with the general historical school of [[Philosophy of history#Cyclical and linear history|non-linear history]].
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Kuhn did not see scientific theory as proceeding linearly from an objective, unbiased accumulation of all available data, but rather as paradigm-driven. “The operations and measurements that a scientist undertakes in the laboratory are not ‘the given’ of experience but rather ‘the collected with difficulty.’ They are not what the scientist sees—at least not before his research is well advanced and his attention focused. Rather, they are concrete indices to the content of more elementary perceptions, and as such they are selected for the close scrutiny of normal research only because they promise opportunity for the fruitful elaboration of an accepted paradigm. Far more clearly than the immediate experience from which they in part derive, operations and measurements are paradigm-determined. Science does not deal in all possible laboratory manipulations. Instead, it selects those relevant to the juxtaposition of a paradigm with the immediate experience that that paradigm has partially determined. As a result, scientists with different paradigms engage in different concrete laboratory manipulations.” <ref>Kuhn, Thomas (1962), ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'', p. 216.</ref>
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Historical examples of chemistry===
| |
| − | Kuhn explains his ideas using examples taken from the [[history of science]]. For instance, eighteenth-century scientists believed that homogenous solutions were [[chemical compound]]s. Therefore, a combination of [[water]] and [[alcohol (chemistry)|alcohol]] was generally classified as a ''compound''. Nowadays it is considered to be a ''solution'', but there was no reason then to suspect that it was not a compound. Water and alcohol would not separate spontaneously, nor will they separate completely upon [[distillation]] (they form an [[azeotrope]]). Water and alcohol can be [[miscibility|combined in any proportion]].
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Under this paradigm, scientists believed that chemical reactions (such as the combination of water and alcohol) did not necessarily occur in fixed proportion. This belief was ultimately overturned by [[John Dalton|Dalton's]] [[atomic theory]], which asserted that atoms can only combine in simple, whole-number ratios. Under this new paradigm, any reaction which did not occur in fixed proportion could not be a chemical process. This type world-view transition among the scientific community exemplifies Kuhn's paradigm shift. <ref>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 130-132</ref>
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Copernican Revolution===
| |
| − | {{main|Copernican Revolution}}
| |
| − | {{Unreferenced section|date=October 2019}}
| |
| − | A famous example of a revolution in scientific thought is the [[De revolutionibus orbium coelestium|Copernican Revolution]]. In [[Ptolemy]]'s school of thought, [[Deferent and epicycle|cycles and epicycles]] (with some additional concepts) were used for modeling the movements of the [[planet]]s in a cosmos that had a stationary Earth at its center. As [[accuracy]] of [[celestial observation]]s increased, complexity of the Ptolemaic cyclical and epicyclical mechanisms had to increase to maintain the calculated planetary positions close to the observed positions. [[Copernicus]] proposed a cosmology in which the Sun was at the center and the Earth was one of the planets revolving around it. For modeling the planetary motions, Copernicus used the tools he was familiar with, namely the cycles and epicycles of the Ptolemaic toolbox. Yet Copernicus' model needed more cycles and epicycles than existed in the then-current Ptolemaic model, and due to a lack of accuracy in calculations, his model did not appear to provide more accurate predictions than the Ptolemy model. Copernicus' contemporaries rejected his [[cosmology]], and Kuhn asserts that they were quite right to do so: Copernicus' cosmology lacked credibility.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Kuhn illustrates how a paradigm shift later became possible when [[Galileo Galilei]] introduced his new ideas concerning motion. Intuitively, when an object is set in motion, it soon comes to a halt. A well-made cart may travel a long distance before it stops, but unless something keeps pushing it, it will eventually stop moving. Aristotle had argued that this was presumably a fundamental property of [[nature]]: for the motion of an object to be sustained, it must continue to be pushed. Given the knowledge available at the time, this represented sensible, reasonable thinking.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Galileo put forward a bold alternative conjecture: suppose, he said, that we always observe objects coming to a halt simply because some [[friction]] is always occurring. Galileo had no equipment with which to objectively confirm his conjecture, but he suggested that without any friction to slow down an object in motion, its inherent tendency is to maintain its [[speed]] without the application of any additional [[force]].
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The Ptolemaic approach of using cycles and epicycles was becoming strained: there seemed to be no end to the mushrooming growth in complexity required to account for the observable phenomena. [[Johannes Kepler]] was the first person to abandon the tools of the Ptolemaic paradigm. He started to explore the possibility that the planet [[Mars]] might have an [[elliptical orbit]] rather than a [[circular orbit|circular]] one. Clearly, the [[angular velocity]] could not be constant, but it proved very difficult to find the formula describing the rate of change of the planet's angular velocity. After many years of calculations, Kepler arrived at what we now know as the [[Kepler's laws of planetary motion#Kepler's second law|law of equal areas]].
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Galileo's conjecture was merely that — a conjecture. So was Kepler's cosmology. But each conjecture increased the credibility of the other, and together, they changed the prevailing perceptions of the scientific community. Later, [[Isaac Newton|Newton]] showed that Kepler's three laws could all be derived from a single theory of motion and planetary motion. Newton solidified and unified the paradigm shift that Galileo and Kepler had initiated.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Coherence===
| |
| − | One of the aims of science is to find models that will account for as many observations as possible within a coherent framework. Together, Galileo's rethinking of the nature of motion and Keplerian cosmology represented a coherent framework that was capable of rivaling the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic framework.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Once a paradigm shift has taken place, the textbooks are rewritten. Often the [[history of science]] too is rewritten, being presented as an inevitable process leading up to the current, established framework of thought. There is a prevalent belief that all hitherto-unexplained phenomena will in due course be accounted for in terms of this established framework. Kuhn states that scientists spend most (if not all) of their careers in a process of puzzle-solving. Their puzzle-solving is pursued with great tenacity, because the previous successes of the established paradigm tend to generate great confidence that the approach being taken guarantees that a solution to the puzzle exists, even though it may be very hard to find. Kuhn calls this process ''[[normal science]]''.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As a paradigm is stretched to its limits, ''anomalies'' — failures of the current paradigm to take into account observed phenomena — accumulate. Their significance is judged by the practitioners of the discipline. Some anomalies may be dismissed as errors in observation, others as merely requiring small adjustments to the current paradigm that will be clarified in due course. Some anomalies resolve themselves spontaneously, having increased the available depth of insight along the way. But no matter how great or numerous the anomalies that persist, Kuhn observes, the practicing scientists will not lose faith in the established paradigm until a credible alternative is available; to lose faith in the solvability of the problems would in effect mean ceasing to be a scientist.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In any community of scientists, Kuhn states, there are some individuals who are bolder than most. These scientists, judging that a ''crisis'' exists, embark on what Kuhn calls ''revolutionary science'', exploring alternatives to long-held, obvious-seeming assumptions. Occasionally this generates a rival to the established framework of thought. The new candidate paradigm will appear to be accompanied by numerous anomalies, partly because it is still so new and incomplete. The majority of the scientific community will oppose any conceptual change, and, Kuhn emphasizes, so they should. To fulfill its potential, a scientific community needs to contain both individuals who are bold and individuals who are conservative. There are many examples in the history of science in which confidence in the established frame of thought was eventually vindicated. It is almost impossible to predict whether the anomalies in a candidate for a new paradigm will eventually be resolved. Those scientists who possess an exceptional ability to recognize a theory's potential will be the first whose preference is likely to shift in favour of the challenging paradigm. There typically follows a period in which there are adherents of both paradigms. In time, if the challenging paradigm is solidified and unified, it will replace the old paradigm, and a ''paradigm shift'' will have occurred.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Phases===
| |
| − | Kuhn explains the process of scientific change as the result of various phases of paradigm change.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | * Phase 1 – It exists only once and is the ''pre-paradigm phase'', in which there is no consensus on any particular [[theory]]. This phase is characterized by several incompatible and incomplete theories. Consequently, most scientific inquiry takes the form of lengthy books, as there is no common body of facts that may be taken for granted. If the actors in the pre-paradigm community eventually gravitate to one of these [[conceptual framework]]s and ultimately to a widespread consensus on the appropriate choice of [[Scientific method|methods]], [[terminology]] and on the kinds of [[experiment]] that are likely to contribute to increased [[insight]]s.<ref>Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|9780226458113}} II. The Route to Normal Science.</ref>
| |
| − | * Phase 2 – [[Normal science]] begins, in which puzzles are solved within the context of the dominant paradigm. As long as there is consensus within the discipline, normal science continues. Over time, progress in normal science may reveal anomalies, facts that are difficult to explain within the context of the existing paradigm.<ref>Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|9780226458113}}. VI. Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific Discoveries</ref> While usually these anomalies are resolved, in some cases they may accumulate to the point where normal science becomes difficult and where weaknesses in the old paradigm are revealed.<ref>Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|9780226458113}}. III. The Nature of Normal Science</ref>
| |
| − | * Phase 3 – If the paradigm proves chronically unable to account for anomalies, the community enters a crisis period. Crises are often resolved within the context of normal science. However, after significant efforts of normal science within a paradigm fail, science may enter the next phase.<ref>Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|9780226458113}}. VII. Crisis and the Emergence of Scientific Theories</ref>
| |
| − | * Phase 4 – [[Paradigm shift]], or scientific revolution, is the phase in which the underlying assumptions of the field are reexamined and a new paradigm is established.<ref>Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). ''The Structure of Scientific Revolution''s (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|9780226458113}}. IX. The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions.</ref>
| |
| − | * Phase 5 – Post-Revolution, the new paradigm's dominance is established and so scientists return to normal science, solving puzzles within the new paradigm.<ref>Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1st ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|9780226458113}}. XII. The Resolution of Revolutions</ref>
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A science may go through these cycles repeatedly, though Kuhn notes that it is a good thing for science that such shifts do not occur often or easily.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Incommensurability===
| |
| − | According to Kuhn, the scientific paradigms preceding and succeeding a paradigm shift are so different that their theories are [[commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurable]] — the new paradigm cannot be proven or disproven by the rules of the old paradigm, and vice versa. (A later interpretation by Kuhn of 'commensurable' versus 'incommensurable' was as a distinction between ''languages'', namely, that statements in commensurable languages were translatable fully from one to the other, while in ''in''commensurable languages, strict translation is not possible.<ref name=Conant>
| |
| − |
| |
| − | {{cite book |page=4 |chapter=Editors' introduction |author=James Conant, John Haugeland |title=The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview |edition=2nd |year=2002 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0226457994}}
| |
| − |
| |
| − | </ref>) The paradigm shift does not merely involve the revision or transformation of an individual theory, it changes the way terminology is defined, how the scientists in that field view their subject, and, perhaps most significantly, what questions are regarded as valid, and what rules are used to determine the truth of a particular theory. The new theories were not, as the scientists had previously thought, just extensions of old theories, but were instead completely new world views.
| |
| − | Such incommensurability exists not just before and after a paradigm shift, but in the periods in between conflicting paradigms. It is simply not possible, according to Kuhn, to construct an impartial language that can be used to perform a neutral comparison between conflicting paradigms, because the very terms used are integral to the respective paradigms, and therefore have different connotations in each paradigm. The advocates of mutually exclusive paradigms are in a difficult position: "''Though each may hope to convert the other to his way of seeing science and its problems, neither may hope to prove his case. The competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs.'' (p. 148)" Scientists subscribing to different paradigms end up [[talking past each other|talking past one another]].
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Kuhn states that the probabilistic tools used by [[Verificationism|verificationists]] are inherently inadequate for the task of deciding between conflicting theories, since they belong to the very paradigms they seek to compare. Similarly, observations that are intended to [[falsifiability|falsify]] a statement will fall under one of the paradigms they are supposed to help compare, and will therefore also be inadequate for the task. According to Kuhn, the concept of falsifiability is unhelpful for understanding why and how science has developed as it has. In the practice of science, scientists will only consider the possibility that a theory has been falsified if an alternative theory is available that they judge credible. If there is not, scientists will continue to adhere to the established conceptual framework. If a paradigm shift has occurred, the textbooks will be rewritten to state that the previous theory has been falsified.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Kuhn further developed his ideas regarding incommensurability in the 1980s and 1990s. In his unpublished manuscript ''The Plurality of Worlds'', Kuhn introduces the theory of ''kind concepts:'' sets of interrelated concepts that are characteristic of a time period in a science and differ in structure from the modern analogous kind concepts. These different structures imply different “[[Taxonomy (biology)|taxonomies]]” of things and processes, and this difference in taxonomies constitutes incommensurability.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On|last=Hoyningen-Huene|first=Paul|publisher=Springer International Publishing|year=2015|isbn=978-3-319-13382-9|series=Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science|volume=311|chapter=Kuhn’s Development Before and After Structure}}</ref> This theory is strongly naturalistic and draws on developmental psychology to “found a quasi-transcendental theory of experience and of reality.”<ref>{{Cite book|title=Kuhn's Development Before and After Structure|volume = 311|pages = 185–195|last=Hoyningen-Huene|first=Paul|date=March 19, 2015|publisher=Springer International Publishing|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-13383-6_13|series = Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science|isbn = 978-3-319-13382-9}}</ref>
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ===Exemplar===
| |
| − | Kuhn introduced the concept of an '''exemplar''' in a [[postscript]] to the second edition of ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1970). He noted that he was substituting the term 'exemplars' for 'paradigm', meaning the problems and solutions that students of a subject learn from the beginning of their education. For example, [[physicists]] might have as exemplars the [[inclined plane]], [[Kepler's laws of planetary motion]], or instruments like the [[calorimeter]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kuhn|first1=Thomas S.|title=The structure of scientific revolutions|date=1970|publisher=Univ. of Chicago Press|location=Chicago|isbn=978-0-226-45804-5|page=[https://archive.org/details/structureofscie000kuhn/page/187 187]|edition=2nd, Enlarged|url=https://archive.org/details/structureofscie000kuhn/page/187|access-date=23 September 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Bird|first1=Alexander|title=Thomas Kuhn|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/|website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=23 September 2017|date=2013}}</ref>
| |
| − |
| |
| − | According to Kuhn, scientific practice alternates between periods of [[normal science]] and [[revolutionary science]]. During periods of normalcy, scientists tend to subscribe to a large body of interconnecting knowledge, methods, and assumptions which make up the reigning [[paradigm]] (see [[paradigm shift]]). Normal science presents a series of problems that are solved as scientists explore their field. The solutions to some of these problems become well known and are the exemplars of the field.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Bird|first1=Alexander|last2=Ladyman|first2=James|title=Arguing about Science|date=2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9780415492294|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iGpd3xLGNbYC&q=well+known+and+are+the+exemplars+of+the+field&pg=PA218|access-date=23 September 2017|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions|url=http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/220/notes_8.html|website=philosophy.wisc.edu|access-date=23 September 2017}}</ref>
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Those who study a scientific discipline are expected to know its exemplars. There is no fixed set of exemplars, but for a physicist today it would probably include the [[harmonic oscillator]] from [[mechanics]] and the [[hydrogen atom]] from [[quantum mechanics]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Wray|first1=K. Brad|title=Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemiology|date=September 29, 2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9781139503464|page=59|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UH67vnSZFy4C&q=kuhn%27s+evolutionary+social+epistemology|access-date=23 September 2017}}</ref>
| |
We would like our reader to have an immediate perception of the topics that will be debated in Masticationpedia; we will review some of the most current issues concerning the epistemological evolution of science in general, and medical as well as dental medicine in particular.
In this phase we will consider the two fundamental aspects of Progress of Science, according to the Kuhn Paradigms, and Epistemology which questions the concepts of "Statistical Inference" and "Interdisciplinarity".
These two themes, which apparently seem to be in conflict with each other, as the first one needs disciplinarity to highlight the "Anomalies in the Paradigm" and the second needs "Interdisciplinarity", they will integrate through a resolving element that consists of "metacognitive scaffolds", i.e. cognitive bridges between specialist disciplines. In this context, therefore, the reader will be better able to appreciate the stochastic approach towards one of the most controversial topics in masticatory rehabilitations, such as, "Malocclusion", from which come most of the masticatory rehabilitation procedures such as orthodontics, prosthesis and orthognathic surgery.
So, in addition to anticipating the scientific and philosophical aspect of Masticationpedia, we will finally focus on topics such as "Complex Systems", the "Emergent Behaviour" of Complex Systems and "System’s Coherence": necessary steps to introduce scientific clinical topics which bring with them doubts, questions and at the same time paradigmatic innovations tending to change the status quo of the deterministic and reductionist clinical thinking routine, before a stochastic and interdisciplinary language logic.
Before getting to the heart of the Masticationpedia treatment, a premise is appropriate, that mainly concerns two aspects of the social, scientific and clinical reality of the current and the immediately preceding era.
In the last century, we witnessed exponential growth in technological and methodological "Innovations" specifically in dentistry[2]; these innovations have in some way influenced decision-making strategies, opinions, schools of thought and axioms in order to improve quality of life, as stated in the "Exposure Science in the 21st Century"[3]. However, this exponential growth brings with it, implicitly, conceptual gray areas (in practical terms "side effects") which are sometimes underestimated, but which may call into question some Scientific Certainties or make them less absolute and more probabilistic.[4]
The phases of paradigm change according to Thomas Kuhn
The two sensitive aspects of the current social, scientific and clinical reality (which seem to conflict with each other, but as we will see at the end of this reading will be complementary) are the "Progress of Science" according to Kuhn and the "Epistemology".
Progress of Science according to Thomas Kuhn
Thomas Kuhn in his most famous work states that science cyclically passes through some phases indicative of its operation.[5][6] According to Kuhn, science is paradigmatic, and the demarcation between science and pseudoscience can be traced back to the existence of a paradigm. The evolution of scientific progress is assimilated to a continuous curve which undergoes discontinuity in paradigm changes.
For example, in phase 2 of the Kuhn Paradigms, called Normal Science, scientists are seen as problem solvers, who work to improve the agreement between the paradigm and nature.
This phase, in fact, is based on a set of basic principles dictated by the paradigm, which are not questioned but which, indeed, are entrusted with the task of indicating the coordinates of the works to come. In this phase, the measuring instruments with which the experiments are made are developed, most of the scientific articles are produced and its results constitute significant growth in scientific knowledge. In the normal science phase both successes and failures will be achieved; the failures are called by Kuhn anomalies, or events that go against the paradigm.
As a good problem solver, the scientist tries to solve these anomalies.
Kuhn's phases in Dentistry
Kuhn, however, divides the evolution of a paradigm into five phases; this is a fundamental process for Masticationpedia, but to keep tuned with the project, we will limit ourselves to describing the two most significant phases:
|
|
- Phase 4, or the Crisis of the Paradigm
As a consequence of the crisis, different paradigms will be created during this period. These new paradigms will, therefore, not arise from the results achieved by the previous theory, but rather from the abandonment of the pre-established schemes of the dominant paradigm.
Following this path, in Masticationpedia, the crisis of the masticatory rehabilitation paradigm will be discussed reviewing theories, theorems, axioms, schools of thought and the Research Diagnostic Criteria and then the focus will shift on phase 5.
|
|
|
- Phase 5, or the Scientific Revolution
Phase 5 deals with the (scientific) revolution. In the period of extraordinary scientific activities, a discussion will open within the scientific community on which new paradigm to accept. But it will not necessarily be the most "true" or most efficient paradigm to come to the fore, but the one that will be able to capture the interest of a sufficient number of scientists and to gain the trust of the scientific community.
The paradigms that participate in this clash, according to Kuhn, share nothing, not even the bases and, therefore, are not comparable (they are "immeasurable"). The paradigm is chosen, as said, on socio-psychological or biological basis (young scientists replace older ones). The battle between paradigms will resolve the crisis, the new paradigm will be named and science will be brought back to Phase 1.
For the same principle of Phase 4, Masticationpedia will propose, in the chapter titled Extraordinary science, a new paradigmatic model in the field of rehabilitation of the Masticatory System discussing its principles, motivations, clinical scientific experiences and, above all, a radical change in the field of medical diagnostics. This change is essentially based on System Inference, rather than on Symptom Inference, giving mainly absolute value to the objectivity of the data.
|
It is almost obvious that Kuhnian scientific philosophy prefers disciplinarity, as an anomaly in the genomic paradigm will be noticed better by a geneticist than by a neurophysiologist. Now this concept would seem to be in contrast with the epistemological evolution of Science, so it is better to stop a minute upon it in detail.
Bibliography
- ↑ Latin for "since the very beginning"
- ↑ Heft MW, Fox CH, Duncan RP, «Assessing the Translation of Research and Innovation into Dental Practice», in JDR Clin Trans Res, 2019.
DOI:10.1177/2380084419879391
- ↑ «Exposure Science in the 21st Century. A Vision and a Strategy», Committee on Human and Environmental Exposure Science in the 21st Century; Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Research Council..
ISBN: 0-309-26468-5
- ↑ Liu L, Li Y, «The unexpected side effects and safety of therapeutic monoclonal antibodies», in Drugs Today, 2014, Barcellona.
DOI:10.1358/dot.2014.50.1.2076506
- ↑ Thomas Samuel Kuhn (Cincinnati, 18 july 1922 – Cambridge, 17 june 1996) was an American philosopher of science.
See Treccani, Kuhn, Thomas Samuel. Wikipedia, Thomas Kuhn.
- ↑ Kuhn Thomas S, «The Structure of Scientific Revolutions», Univ. of Chicago Press, 2012, Chicago.
ISBN: 9780226458113
